A Community Privacy Initiative
Peapack-Gladstone, New Jersey
Flock Safety license plate readers are a $7.5 billion surveillance network masquerading as a public safety tool. Here's what your borough officials may not have told you — and what you can do about it.
⚠ Active Surveillance Infrastructure
These cameras record every vehicle entering or leaving town. Your plate, timestamp, and direction of travel are stored for 30 days and searchable by thousands of law enforcement agencies nationwide.
View All Cameras on DeFlock.me ↗📍 Camera locations are approximate based on reported road exit points. Click any marker for details. Map data © OpenStreetMap contributors. | Know of another camera? Report it at deflock.me
Official Records · Peapack-Gladstone OPRA Request · July–August 2026
A Flock Safety audit log — produced by the Peapack-Gladstone Police Department and obtained through a public records request — covers 30 days of camera operation. It shows who is actually using these cameras. The Borough Council has never been shown this data.
| Agency | Searches | Primary Reason Logged |
|---|---|---|
| NJ State Police — Backtrace API | 86,718 | Automated statewide database check on every plate detected |
| Linden NJ PD | 250 | Drug / narcotics investigations |
| Somerset County Prosecutors Office | 103 | Burglary, theft, traffic |
| Franklin NJ PD (Somerset) ⚠ | 90 | 35 searches logged as "DEA investigation" |
| North Brunswick NJ PD | 73 | Vehicle theft, burglary |
| Woodbridge NJ PD | 55 | Eluding, robbery |
| Sayreville NJ PD | 49 | Vehicle theft, robbery |
| Hillsborough Twp NJ PD | 49 | Assault, stolen property |
| Edison NJ PD | 43 | Theft, burglary |
| Sparta Twp NJ PD | 43 | Vehicle theft, eluding |
| South Plainfield NJ PD | 38 | Hit and run |
| Westfield NJ PD | 37 | Hit and run |
| Flemington NJ PD | 26 | Hit and run |
| Jersey City NJ PD | 22 | Various |
| Warren NJ PD | 21 | Burglary |
| Clark NJ PD | 21 | Various |
| 11 additional agencies Roxbury, Monroe, Westampton, Bernardsville, Perth Amboy, Green Brook, Metuchen, Watchung, South Amboy, Elizabeth, Bedminster | 43 | Various |
| Peapack-Gladstone NJ PD The borough's own police — the only department these cameras were approved to serve |
7 | Burglary investigations only |
Source: Flock Safety System Audit Log, Jul. 21–Aug. 20, 2026. Produced by NJ–Peapack Gladstone PD, Officer Paul Morris. Obtained via OPRA request, September 2026.
⚠ The Bigger Picture
This map — captured from DeFlock.org on September 18, 2026 — shows every reported ALPR camera in the Somerset Hills area. The moment a Peapack-Gladstone resident drives in any direction, they enter additional camera coverage in Bedminster, Bernardsville, Basking Ridge, or Liberty Corner. Their complete daily movement pattern is captured across multiple jurisdictions, with no single town aware of the full picture.
Flock Safety is an Atlanta-based company that sells automated license plate reader (ALPR) cameras to police departments and municipalities across the country. As of 2025, they operate cameras in over 5,000 communities, scanning more than 20 billion license plates per month.
The cameras are solar-powered, mounted on poles, and designed to photograph every vehicle that passes — recording license plates, timestamps, and vehicle fingerprints. That data is stored for up to 30 days and made searchable — not just by local police, but by thousands of agencies across the country.
Flock markets its cameras as a crime-fighting tool. But a wave of investigations in 2024 and 2025 revealed something very different: a privately-controlled surveillance network that local governments do not fully own or control, sharing data with federal immigration agencies, and riddled with security vulnerabilities that make your movements accessible to virtually anyone.
"Flock is not operating in good faith, and you have no control over where the data goes."
— Tracy Rosenberg, Oakland PrivacyThese are not hypothetical concerns. They are documented incidents, confirmed by police audits, court filings, public records requests, and official city statements.
The Mountain View PD discovered federal agencies had accessed their camera data via a "nationwide search" feature Flock enabled without their knowledge. 29 of 30 cameras were also accessed by unapproved California agencies.
Shortly after launch, Lynnwood discovered Flock had enabled a "nationwide search" feature that gave far broader access than the city ever approved. They had to demand Flock disable it.
After ordering Flock cameras removed for violating state privacy law, Evanston discovered Flock had reinstalled them without authorization. The city issued a cease-and-desist order.
Cambridge deactivated 16 cameras, then found Flock had secretly installed two more on an outstanding work order that should have been canceled. The city called it a "material breach of our trust."
Eugene ordered a camera shut down — and later discovered it had been reactivated. They found out from a community member, not from Flock Safety.
Santa Cruz and other California cities discovered their local data had been shared with Flock's national network without officials' knowledge — violating California state law.
CEO Garrett Langley previously denied Flock had federal contracts. After a Denver news outlet exposed a CBP pilot program, Langley admitted the company's "public statements inadvertently provided inaccurate information."
Researchers found Border Patrol had apparent back-door access to data from at least 10 Washington agencies that had never explicitly authorized Border Patrol sharing — from May to August 2025.
Cities using Flock cameras made contradictory legal arguments in court about whether data belongs to the city or to Flock — exposing the fundamental ambiguity Flock built into its contracts.
Flock claims cities own their data, but its system is built around maximum sharing: agencies that share their data with the national network get access to everyone else's — a "show me yours, I'll show you mine" design.
Independent cybersecurity researchers documented 51 security vulnerabilities in Flock's systems in 2025, 22 with official CVE designations. Then in September 2026, a hacker collective physically removed a camera, extracted its storage, and revealed what Flock never disclosed: these cameras aren't just reading license plates.
⚡ Breaking — September 16, 2026 · 404 Media & WIRED
Hacker collective stegan0gram physically removed a Flock Safety camera from above a roadway, copied its internal storage, and shared the files with 404 Media and WIRED. The extracted data revealed what Flock never publicly disclosed:
September 17, 2026 · 404 Media
Flock Safety created a fictitious entity called "Flock City PD" and used it to run searches on live municipal cameras during sales demonstrations — including cameras covering a children's gymnastics room, a school, a playground, a pool, and the Marcus Jewish Community Center in Dunwoody, Georgia. Searches conducted under Flock City PD included:
Flock claimed the sensitive searches were to demonstrate what police shouldn't do — using real residents' real data to do it. After exposure, Flock City PD was "isolated." The borough of Peapack-Gladstone has no technical guarantee that Flock employees cannot access its cameras during sales pitches to other agencies.
Sources: 404 Media, WIRED, Distributed Denial of Secrets — September 16, 2026; 404 Media — September 17, 2026 (Flock City PD); September 30, 2026 (HIDTA). Invoice INV-96949, Borough of Peapack-Gladstone, obtained via OPRA request September 2026.
A specific button sequence on the back of the camera creates a Wi-Fi hotspot. From there, anyone can connect, enable full Android device access, and install malicious software or extract data. "The longest part is waiting for the hotspot to turn on."
Cameras have completely exposed USB ports. A "rubber ducky" USB device — which pretends to be a keyboard — can be plugged in to execute malicious scripts in seconds.
After gaining access, researchers were able to plant images on devices. Images from the factory manufacturing floor were also found still stored on deployed cameras — suggesting images are never deleted. This threatens the evidentiary value of all Flock footage in court.
At least 60 Flock Condor PTZ cameras were found streaming live video to the open internet with zero password protection. Anyone with a link could watch live feeds and 30 days of archives — including footage of children at playgrounds.
Cameras transmit credentials in cleartext — unencrypted. Hard-coded Wi-Fi names mean cameras can be tricked into connecting to a rogue hotspot. An IMSI catcher (fake cell tower) can also intercept camera communications.
CVE assignedResearcher Ben Jordan found Flock law enforcement login credentials actively for sale on dark web marketplaces. Because MFA was not required, any buyer could log in and search the entire nationwide license plate network.
Flock did not require MFA until November 2024 — and even then only for new users. Existing agencies could still opt out. Lawmakers called it "unfathomably bad" for a system logging the location of every driver.
Cameras store images locally without encryption, whether or not a license plate was detected — meaning innocent bystanders' images are stored in plaintext on publicly-mounted hardware accessible to anyone.
Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR) and Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL) formally urged the FTC to investigate Flock Safety for failing to protect Americans' data from hackers, criminals, and foreign spies. Flock confirmed to Congress it did not require MFA.
Since February 2025, at least 30 localities have canceled or deactivated their Flock contracts. Here are the tactics that worked — ranked from most accessible to most aggressive.
Austin, TX canceled after 30+ community groups organized together. Single voices rarely win — coalitions do. The bipartisan nature of opposition (privacy concerns cross political lines) makes individual council members much harder to ignore.
→ Used in: Austin, TX · Eugene, OR · Sedona, AZ
In Olympia, WA, nearly 200 residents showed up at a city meeting. The next day, cameras were covered for removal. Large, visible turnout signals to elected officials that keeping the cameras carries real political cost.
→ Used in: Olympia, WA · San Diego, CA · Oakland, CA
Demand your borough audit who is accessing their camera data. Mountain View, CA didn't know about federal agency access until they checked. Audit results give residents concrete, undeniable evidence at council meetings.
→ Used in: Mountain View, CA · Danville, VA · Denver, CO
New Jersey has privacy and sanctuary protections. Identify the specific state statutes Flock's data sharing may violate — this transforms a political debate into a legal obligation for elected officials to act.
→ Used in: Multiple California cities (SB34) · Oregon sanctuary law cities · Illinois
The Illinois Secretary of State launched an audit after EFF research showed Flock violated state law — directly leading to Evanston's cancellation. Contacting your NJ state legislators or attorney general can generate pressure local officials alone cannot.
→ Used in: Illinois (Secretary of State audit, 2025)
Cambridge, MA found Flock had secretly installed cameras without authorization — and used it to terminate for cause. Document every instance of Flock acting without borough permission as potential grounds for contract termination.
→ Used in: Cambridge, MA · Evanston, IL
Hillsborough, NC ended their contract specifically over contract language allowing Flock to share data with any government entity it deemed necessary. In immigrant communities, the fear of ICE access has been the single most effective mobilizing argument.
→ Used in: Hillsborough, NC · Santa Cruz, CA · Talent, OR
Bring EFF reports, ACLU analyses, and peer-reviewed security research to council meetings. "Here is what independent experts found" is harder to dismiss than community opinion alone. Put officials on record accepting or rejecting documented evidence of harm.
→ Used in: Austin, TX · Evanston, IL · Eugene, OR
DeFlock.me has crowdsource-mapped over 76,000 Flock cameras nationwide. Use it to find all Flock infrastructure in Peapack-Gladstone. You can't fight what you can't see — mapping makes cameras politically visible and accountable.
→ Tool: DeFlock.me
Contract language that allows Flock broad data-sharing discretion, auto-renewal clauses, and ambiguous ownership provisions are powerful when read aloud to the public. It reframes renewal as an active political choice officials must defend.
→ Used in: Hillsborough, NC · Multiple Oregon cities
Each city that drops Flock makes it easier for the next. Show your council: Mountain View, Cambridge, Evanston — these are not hypotheticals. Build a narrative of a company-wide pattern that makes denial politically untenable.
→ Effective across all 30+ cancellation cities in 2025–2026
You don't need to be an activist or a lawyer. You just need to show up.
Show up and ask: Does Peapack-Gladstone have a Flock contract? If so, who can access our data? Have we been audited? Your presence alone sends a message.
Submit an OPRA (Open Public Records Act) request to the Peapack-Gladstone Borough. Ask for any contracts with Flock Safety, data sharing agreements, and access logs. This is your legal right in New Jersey.
Visit DeFlock.me and check if Flock cameras have been spotted in Peapack-Gladstone or nearby Somerset County. If you see one, report its location to the crowdsourced map.
Call or email your NJ state legislators. Ask them to support ALPR data sharing restrictions and oversight requirements. Reference what Illinois, California, and Oregon have already done.
Reach out to neighbors, local organizations, faith communities, and businesses. The most successful campaigns — Austin, Eugene, Sedona — started with a handful of determined people who knew their neighbors.
The more Peapack-Gladstone residents know, the harder it becomes for local officials to quietly sign or renew a contract. Share this site on social media, NextDoor, and in community groups.
New Jersey's Open Public Records Act gives every resident the legal right to demand records from government agencies. Use this tool to generate ready-to-send OPRA requests to the Borough, Somerset County, and the State of New Jersey — asking about any Flock Safety contracts, data sharing agreements, and access logs.
National Coverage
Major investigations and reporting on Flock Safety from national outlets. Every link opens the original source.
Their police jobs ended. They kept using Flock’s vast surveillance network.
Former officers kept active Flock credentials after leaving their departments — continuing to search the network undetected for years. Flock was warned after a 2024 breach and did not fix it.
Read story →How Flock’s cameras spread through government deals that bypassed public scrutiny
Dozens of communities never voted on whether to install Flock cameras. Police departments purchased the technology through deals that avoided competitive bidding or fell just below council approval thresholds.
Read story →Police Chief Discontinues Flock After Review Creates “Loss of Confidence”
Chief Gordon Young ended the program, disabled external sharing, and is covering cameras with Public Works. His statement: “Technology must be supported by transparency, accountability, and professional service.”
Read official statement →How Cities Are Forced to Funnel License Plate Data to a Massive Federal Surveillance Program
The Trump administration uses the HIDTA program to route local ALPR data to White House-controlled federal servers. Those records are not subject to FOIA or OPRA. The true number of federal searches is unknowable.
Read story →Flock City PD: The Fake Flock-Owned “Police Department” That Searched Real Cameras
Flock created a fictional police department and used it to search live municipal cameras — including cameras at schools, playgrounds, and the Marcus Jewish Community Center — during sales demonstrations.
Read story →Hackers Extract Flock Camera Data — Revealing It Tracks Pedestrians and Cyclists Too
A forensic extraction of a Flock camera found its software explicitly detects pedestrians and cyclists in addition to license plates — never disclosed to municipalities. 1.6 million images captured in 21 days from one camera.
Read story →Americans have turned against police cameras that track license plates, new survey shows
More Americans now oppose Flock cameras than support them. A Reuters/Ipsos poll shows 47% oppose, 38% support. Communities that were early adopters are reconsidering.
Read story →Police departments weren’t looking for officers abusing Flock. We did it for them.
A Post investigation led to the discipline of officers accused of misuse. Their departments had done no basic oversight — the misuse was discovered by journalists, not supervisors.
Read story →How rogue officers turned a nationwide camera network into a tool for stalking
At least 50 officers charged with or accused of using Flock to track romantic partners and exes. In one case, a police chief searched his ex-girlfriend’s plate more than 500 times.
Read story →The Deal has been Altered Further: Flock Publishes New Terms
A legal analysis of Flock’s 2026 contract terms: perpetual data license, deleted AI training guardrails, Georgia-only arbitration, liability capped even for gross negligence, and an exit clause that may be unenforceable.
Read analysis →Everything on this site is sourced. Here are the primary documents, news investigations, and tools that inform our work.
We have filed Open Public Records Act (OPRA) requests with the Borough of Peapack-Gladstone, Somerset County, and the State of New Jersey. Below is a running log of what we requested, what we received, and what it reveals. All documents are posted in full.
NJ OPRA LAW: Agencies must respond within 7 business days. Denials must cite a specific statutory exemption. If records are wrongly withheld, file a free complaint at nj.gov/grc — no lawyer required.